Abstract
This paper shows that the tour operators (TOs) can play a coordinating role in the adoption of environmental management upstream the tourism supply chain. This is done using a dynamic model to analyze the environmental management adoption by hotels in a tourism destination induced by a TO. The TO can create incentives to greening hotels’ management through the sharing of an environmental price premium. We show that the extent of green management adoption depends on interest rate, the willingness to pay for environmental quality, and hotels’ organizational inertia. We also show how the financial yields from green management are shared between TOs and hotels. Finally, we consider a destination manager that subsidizes hotels’ green management. If the destination manager does not take the greening role of TOs into account, she could mistake the true trade-off that she faces between the destination’s economic and environmental outcomes for the win–win setting that characterizes the general problem.
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Notes
For a straightforward exposition of the problem in this section, we assume the familiar game-theoretical assumptions of hotels’ full rationality and full information. Instead, “TOs and the Under-Adoption of Green Management” section considers the more realistic assumption that hotels are bounded rational.
Nash equilibria with “cooperators” and “defectors” also arise in the classical Chicken game and the Snowdrift dilemma. In a way that resembles the Snowdrift dilemma, in our model, too many (few) of already green hotels makes becoming green less (more) profitable than remaining non-green.
If \(\left( {\frac{\gamma \omega }{\alpha }} \right)^{{\frac{1}{1 - \gamma }}} \le N\), then a corner solution is reached where \(N_{\text{g}}^{I} = N_{\text{g}}^{C} = N_{\text{g}}^{\text{TO}} = N\).
Notice that an equivalent effect would be obtained if there are no TOs but hotels are owned by Z hotel chains. We thank an anonymous referee for this remark.
That is, the game structure is still Chicken game-like, as without TOs. See footnote number 3.
An interesting avenue of research would be to explore how the presence of TOs changes the rules of the game that determines the greening of hotels’ management.
Although this is a common wisdom, Aragón-Correa et al. (2008) show evidence of significant environmental strategies by SMEs in the automotive repair sector in Southern Spain.
In the literature, a slow adjustment to profit-maximizing behavior is commonly assumed in different settings such as evolutionary economics models (Blanco et al. 2009a), natural resource management (Rondeau and Bulte 2007), or microeconomic models of production (Howroyd and Rickard 1981; Szidarovsky and Yen 1995).
These costs are like an investment and should be incorporated in the payoff function of an agent that considers the long-term consequences of decision-taking. Therefore, this assumption can be regarded as a byproduct of our assumptions of myopic hotels and forward-looking TO.
We consider the destination manager’s objective setting and policy choice as given. However, in reality they are the result of a complex institutional process of decision making inside the destination management organizations.
Period-by-period operational costs associated with green management are not included to simplify notation. It is straightforward to extend our results to the case where these operational costs exist.
It can be easily shown that, for a constant N, \(\alpha \left( {N\dot{S}_{\text{g}} } \right)^{2} = \alpha \left( {\dot{N}_{\text{g}} } \right)^{2}\), and the cost of greening is thus a when \(\dot{N}_{\text{g}} = 1\).
There are more intuitive arguments to rule out the trajectories that lead to corner solutions. For instance, the trajectories that lead to the Pϕmax cannot be optimal because once Pϕmax is reached, it is better to reduce h to zero. But this alternative trajectory implies a discontinuity (a jump from h > 0 to h = 0) that is not consistent with the dynamic equation for h and therefore cannot be optimal.
Notice that if we assume the existence of operative costs for green management borne by the hotels, a positive h at least equal to these costs is required to avoid incentives to abandon green practices.
We can assume that these subsidies are financed using lump sum taxes levied on other parts of the economic system. Notice that results in this section could be different if these subsidies were financed with taxes levied on the economic agents considered in the model.
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Acknowledgments
This paper was written thanks to a scholarship award from TIRME S.A. We would like to express our gratitude to this institution for its trust, financial support and information. The authors would also like to thank Catalina Sbert and Marc Carbonell from the University of the Balearic Islands (UIB) for their valuable and generous help.
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Appendices
Appendix I: Equilibrium Conditions
To solve expression (4) applying optimal control, we first build its Hamiltonian:
where q represents the shadow value for the TO that is generated by one additional hotel deciding to be “green.” This shadow value corresponds to the discounted future stream of environmental price premiums generated by this new green hotel less the discounted future stream of payments, h, made to this hotel by the TO.
Then, the maximum principle conditions (Chiang 1992) are
and the transversality condition (Chiang 1992):
To obtain expression (5), we first obtain the value of “q” from (14)
Taking the derivative with respect to time, the expression (18) gives place to
Combining (3) with (21) and (16) we obtain (5) and (6), respectively.
Appendix II: Stability Conditions
A steady state of the system (5), (6) is locally asymptotically stable when the determinant of the Jacobian evaluated at that equilibrium has a positive value while the trace is negative. It is locally asymptotically unstable when both the determinant and the trace are positive, whereas it is a saddle-point when the determinant is negative. Through linearization we obtain a system whose Jacobian is the following equations:
where a star indicates a steady state value. From mere inspection, and given that \(P_{\phi } \ge 0\), it is clear that the determinant of the Jacobian is negative and, therefore, the steady state is saddle path.
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Lozano, J., Arbulú, I. & Rey-Maquieira, J. The Greening Role of Tour Operators. Environmental Management 57, 49–61 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00267-015-0587-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00267-015-0587-9