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Spieltheoretische Modellierung in den international vergleichenden Beziehungen

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Methoden der vergleichenden Politik- und Sozialwissenschaft

Auszug

Die konstatierte zunehmende Verflechtung zwischen Gesellschaften und die durchlässiger gewordenen Grenzen zwischen ökonomischen und politischen Systemen macht sich auch zunehmend in der Auflösung innerdisziplinärer Barrieren innerhalb der Politikwissenschaft bemerkbar (vgl. Werner/Davis/Bueno de Mesquita 2003). Wenn auch keine neue Teildisziplin begründend, so soll der Begriff der international vergleichenden Beziehungen diesen Wandel begrifflich kenntlich machen. Daher ist zunächst eine begriffliche Präzisierung notwendig, um im Anschluss auf die Begründung für seine Verwendung einzugehen.

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    Konstantin Baltz (wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter)

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Baltz, K. (2009). Spieltheoretische Modellierung in den international vergleichenden Beziehungen. In: Pickel, S., Pickel, G., Lauth, HJ., Jahn, D. (eds) Methoden der vergleichenden Politik- und Sozialwissenschaft. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91826-6_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91826-6_4

  • Publisher Name: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-531-16194-5

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